Little is known about the effects of revealing information on relative performance during a dynamic tournament. We empirically study the impact of interim rank on risk taking and performance using data on professionals competing in tournaments for large rewards. As our data allows us to observe both the intended action and the performance of each participant, we can thus measure risk taking and performance separately. We present two key findings. First, risk taking exhibits an inverted-U relationship with interim rank. Revealing information on relative performance induces individuals trailing just behind the interim leaders to take greater risks. Second, competitors systematically underperform when ranked closer to the top, despite higher incentives to perform well. Disclosing information on relative ranking hinders interim leaders.
Introduction
Individuals competing in tournaments are rewarded on the basis of their relative, rather than absolute, performance. Many everyday fields of economic activity are characterized by such a tournament-like structure. Employees and managers in labor markets, for example, are subject to relative performance evaluations within a firm; in financial markets, mutual funds compete in attracting new funds on the basis of their relative performance; in product markets, companies compete in patent races to secure the rights to new products; in schools, students and teachers may be ranked according to their relative performance; and, finally, the majority of sporting events are organized as tournaments.
An extensive literature emphasizes the role of tournaments in realigning the incentives of the parties involved (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983) .
For instance, in the labor market, a tournament among managers could provide incentive for improved effort resulting in higher performance, thus mitigating the typical inefficiencies caused by the conflicting objectives of managers and shareholders.
However, it is likely that tournaments affect not only choices concerning effort, but other aspects of individual behavior as well, including risk taking and performance under pressure. In addition, tournaments are often dynamic, so the incentives generated by the competition may be different for individuals leading in the competition and those lagging behind. Individuals with a high interim rank, for example, may try to protect their position by decreasing risk taking. Those lower down in the interim rank may engage in riskier strategies in an attempt to catch up with the leaders. Exactly how agents' risk-taking behavior and performance varies depending on relative performance in previous stages of the competition is still an open question, and fundamental to our understanding of tournaments in labor, financial and product markets. From a policy point of view, it is crucial to understand how disclosure of information on relative performance during a competition may affect participants' subsequent behavior. between rank and announcement is informative of athletes' risk-taking behavior, while the relation between rank and the probability of a successful lift is informative of their performance.
The probability that an athlete will succeed in lifting the declared weight during a specific attempt is much less than one. This implies that interim ranking within a competition is very volatile. This variability of interim ranking provides us with an ideal environment for observing how professionals react when in the lead or when trailing other competitors. The panel dimension of the data allows us to control for multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity at the individual, competition and year level. The multistage nature of the games even allows us to estimate specifications where we can control for joint individual-competition-year fixed effects.
We present two key results. First, when lagging behind, competitors tend to take greater risks than when in the lead. However, risk taking exhibits an inverted-U relationship with rank:
announcements increase from first to sixth place, but decrease moving further down in the rank; after rank seventeen, the level of risk taken is not significantly different from first place. The magnitude of the impact of rank is significant. A shift from first to sixth place corresponds to a 1.8Kg increase in announcement, which is 50 percent of the average increase in announcement between two stages.
Our results are in line with the conventional wisdom that troubled firms and interim losers in corporate tournaments are more likely to take riskier strategies than market leaders, or that the trailing team in sports competitions may have a strong incentive to take greater risks. The nonmonotone relation between interim rank and risk taking is consistent with the observation that catching up with the leaders becomes progressively more unlikely as one moves down in the ranking.
Our second result is that, on average, the probability of a successful lift (conditional on the chosen weight) significantly increases when moving down in the ranking. An athlete in sixth place is at least 10 percent more likely to lift the declared weight than when he is ranked first. It 5 seems unlikely that athletes exert less effort when ranked at the top. 4 An alternative explanation for this result is that athletes underperform under pressure, despite strong motivation and effort (Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein and Mazar, 2009; Dohmen, 2008; Apesteguia and PalaciosHuerta, 2009 ). This interpretation is consistent with anecdotal evidence that athletes' performance may deteriorate as the stakes rise, or when there are strong expectations for an outstanding performance. In line with the hypothesis that individuals perform badly under pressure, we show that the probability of failing to lift a given weight is higher when the competition is more intense or more prestigious.
Our work is related to a growing empirical literature on tournaments. Four key aspects distinguish our work from earlier studies. First, our paper focuses on the effects of interim rank within a tournament. The existing literature has mainly focused on the impact of the overall level of prizes, or on different compensation schemes. 5 Second, most studies focus on either performance or risk taking. When they do attempt to measure risk taking, they focus on variability in performance or other output measures. 6 Differently from previous studies, we can measure risk taking separately from performance, and we can also condition for the intended strategies of participants when comparing performance. 7 Third, we use an exceptionally rich panel dataset that allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in greater detail than previous studies. 4 One would generally expect athletes to be more motivated and to exert greater effort when ranked at the top, where the gain from an increase in rank is highest. The positive relation between rewards, motivation and effort seems to be accepted in the literature (Prendergast 1999) , although with some exceptions (Camerer, Babcock, Lowenstein and Thaler, 1997; Rustichini, 2000a and 2000b; Frey and Jegen, 2001; Heyman and Ariely, 2004) . 5 Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) and Becker and Huselid (1992) use data from sport tournaments to study the link between prizes and performance. Knoeber and Thurman (1994) study the effect of different compensation schemes on the performance of broiler chicken farmers. Main, O'Reilly and Wade (1993) and Eriksson (1999) study corporate tournaments and executive compensation. 6 Very little evidence is available on risk-taking behavior in tournaments. Knoeber and Thurman (1994) provide some evidence that better farmers displayed less volatile performance. Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) show that mutual funds with relatively low mid-year performance increase fund volatility. Bronars and Oettinger (2001) study variability in performance in golf tournaments. Similarly, Lee (2004) studies variability in payoffs in poker tournaments, and Grund and Gurtler (2005) find that losing teams in soccer matches are more likely to make a risky substitution. 7 Consider the case in which leaders in a multistage tournament try to protect their position by taking low risk strategies (strategies with low payoffs but a high probability of success). If the riskiness involved in such strategies is not observable to the researcher, comparing realized payoffs across individuals may not be informative about differences in effort. 6
A brief overview of weight lifting competitions and the data
In weightlifting competitions, athletes attempt to lift heavy weights mounted on steel bars. The relationship between final rank and prizes is convex, particularly at the top. The first three athletes are awarded medals and receive most of the media coverage. Private sponsorships are also offered mainly to medal-winners, and gold medalists receive the lion's share of fame and recognition. National teams often provide substantial monetary rewards and other benefits such 8 Weightlifting has a long history as an Olympic discipline. Men's weightlifting was on the program of the first modern Olympic Games in Athens in 1896, while the first contemporary World Championships took place in London in 1891. 9 In the snatch, they lift the bar to arm's length above their head in one movement. In the clean & jerk, they lift the bar to their shoulders, stand up straight, and then jerk the bar to arm's length above their head. 10 Before the start of each game, competitors are weighed and assigned an official bodyweight. This then determines the weight category in which they will compete. There are eight categories for men and seven for women. Athletes may switch between different categories over the course of their athletic careers. For this reason, our definition of a competitor throughout this paper is an athlete in a particular bodyweight category. 11 Initial announcements are made before the beginning of the stage without knowing the announcements of the others. However, these announcements can be changed during the course of the stage, provided they do not require unloading weight from the bar. In our data set, we observe the final announcements, which correspond to the weights effectively attempted by athletes. When two athletes wish to attempt the same weight, a random lot number publicly assigned at the beginning of the competition determines the order. 12 The weight announced in stage three (the last attempt in snatch) does not affect the announcement in stage four (the first attempt in clean & jerk). 13 For the second and third stage, the interim rank is computed using only the best successful lift in snatch. Variability of ranking, even for a given athlete within a given competition, is significant. On average, the difference between the maximum and minimum interim rank for a given individual within a competition is 6.4 positions, with the 25 th percentile experiencing a change of 3 positions and the 75 th percentile experiencing a change of 8 ranks. Even very consistent weightlifters may oscillate, for example, between getting a gold and getting no medal at all.
Empirical Framework
A key feature of weightlifting competitions is that the outcome of a specific lift is uncertain.
We characterize each athlete's ability as a risk-reward frontier that maps announced weight into 8 the probability of a successful lift. strategy for player i is a function σ i which assigns an action (wait, or lift the current weight) to each information set in which player i makes a decision.
Our first empirical objective is estimating how the announcement decisions depend on the interim ranking. We focus on this specific aspect of the history for two reasons. First, the literature, summarized in Section 1, suggests that interim ranking is a key determinant of risk taking in tournaments. 20 Second, interim ranking is one central piece of information that is 9 reported by athletes to be fundamental and that is readily available throughout the competition, so our focus is consistent with how the game is actually played.
In principle, however, the observed weight chosen by each athlete at each stage may depend on the entire history of the game up to that point. Hence, our empirical identification of the relation between interim rank and risk taking requires imposing some restrictions on what specific features of the history matter for announcements. We start by assuming that the behavior of others affects player i only through the interim ranking. We then relax this assumption by allowing history to matter in a more complex fashion, taking into account measures of proximity of athletes with similar interim scores and other variables potentially correlated with interim ranking. We also allow the relation between interim rank and risk taking to vary across individuals, competition and stages. This is important, as individuals may have different riskreward frontiers, competitions may have different prize levels, and competitors may react differently to changes in interim ranking depending on the stage of the competition.
The second objective of the paper is to investigate how interim ranking affects performance.
We proceed in a similar way and study how the probability of a successful outcome P is depends on the announcement A is and on the interim ranking R is . Performance may depend on interim ranking indirectly, through incentives to perform well, or directly, through the contextual and psychological effects of interim performance. The existing literature, reviewed in Section 4.4, suggests that psychological pressure at the top of the ranking may decrease performance. In interpreting the results in Section 4, we will discuss these two possible channels through which interim ranking may affect performance. As for risk taking, we will also explore other ways in which history may possibly affect performance, and allow for heterogeneity across individuals, competitions and stages.
The Determinants of Announcements
We estimate models of the following general form: Finally, β 2 , β 3 are scalars, whereas β 0 and β 1 are vectors of parameters to be estimated.
The model includes success in the previous round because the rules of the game dictate a minimum increase of 1 Kg after a successful attempt. The level of the previous announcement is also included, as we want to allow for decreasing increments as the absolute level of the announced weight increases.
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Cross-sectional estimates of model (1) will produce biased estimates of all parameters, unless one is able to control for the athletes' ability, which is likely to affect both interim ranking and announcements. Unobserved individual ability may also vary over time, as the quality of each athlete's training may vary across years, or even for different competitions within the same year. 21 The first stage of snatch is dropped because the interim ranking is not defined for the first stage. In estimating model (1) we also dropped the first stage of clean & jerk because the impact of previous announcement and success may be very different during the transition from snatch to clean & jerk, which allows heavier weights to be lifted. The results, however, are not driven by the inclusion or omission of the first stage of clean & jerk. 22 As the minimum increment after a successful attempt is 1 Kg, one could rewrite model (1) as follows:
, where the first bracket is the automatic announcement, dictated by the rules of the game, and the second is the discretionary announcement, capturing athletes' risk taking behavior. Thus, the function f(.) captures the impact of rank on athletes' discretionary announcement, while the parameters β 2 and β 3 in model (1) capture the joint effect on both the automatic and the discretionary announcement (β 2 =1+b 2 ; β 3 =1+b 3 ).
Moreover, the organization of each type of competition may vary across years in ways that are unobserved to the researcher, and this may impact athletes' behavior. Hence, one needs to account for multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
The error term in (1) can be thought of as the sum of athlete, year, competition, athlete-year, competition-year, athlete-competition, athlete-year-competition components,
where ε itjs captures idiosyncratic shocks to the announcement decision, ε itjs~I ID(0,σ ε 2 ).
Alternative specifications are possible, depending on whether unobserved heterogeneity is thought to vary across athletes, years, type of competitions, or their interactions. In the next section, we will report the results using a number of alternative specifications for the unobserved heterogeneity.
Since unobserved heterogeneity is likely to be correlated with previous announcements, performance in previous stages, and therefore interim rank, the random effects assumption is unlikely to be appropriate in this case. Thus, we choose to work with a fixed effects model. Due to the multi-stage nature of weightlifting competitions, we can include athlete-year-competition fixed effects (τ itj ). In this case, the relation between interim rank and announcement is estimated only by exploiting the variability of ranking across stages of the same competition for a given individual.
However, the existence of a lagged dependent variable in (1) 
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Consider now the richest specification with athlete-year-competition fixed effects (τ itj ). First differencing the model eliminates the fixed effects,
and once-lagged predetermined regressors, W itj (s-2) , are valid instruments for ∆W itj(s-1) , so parameters can be estimated using an IV approach (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) . We also employ more efficient GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) by taking into account all the available moment restrictions. Taking first differences and using instrumental variables also deals with the potential bias induced by the relatively short panel. The results, reported in the next section, are remarkably stable across specifications and estimation methodologies.
Finally, our specification assumes that the control variables and fixed effects in (1) capture the main determinants of risk-taking behavior. One concern could be that a higher concentration of athletes with very similar performance may affect an individual's behavior. Similarly, the absolute distance from the closest athletes (following or proceeding) in the ranking may also make a difference. Risk taking may be more rewarding if an athlete leads the closest trailer by a relatively substantial amount, but trails the closest leader by relatively little. We explore these issues in our robustness analysis. None of our results change in any fundamental way.
The Determinants of Performance
We estimate the impact of interim rank on performance using the linear probability model:
where Success itjs is a binary indicator that takes the value of one if athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s (s=2,...,6) 24 was successful in lifting the announced weight 13 (Announcement itjs ), X itj is the same vector of exogenous individual and competition characteristics as before, Rank itj(s-1) is the interim rank of individual i, in year t and competition j, in the previous stage; u itjs is an error term that captures unobserved determinants of a successful lift. Our main interest is in the vector of parameters δ 1 in the flexible functional form g(·), which describes the impact of rank on the probability of success, controlling for announcement. As above, we require g(·) to be linear in the parameters δ 1 . The parameter δ 2 describes the impact of announcement on the probability of a successful lift. In terms of Figure 1 , it is an estimate of the average slope of athletes' risk-reward frontier.
As before, we need to account for unobserved heterogeneity. The unobserved ability of athletes, for example, is likely to be correlated with both interim ranking and the probability of a successful lift. Thus, the random effects assumption seems unrealistic and we consider a fixed effects framework. We correct for unobserved heterogeneity by extensively controlling for fixed effects. In particular, the error term in (4) can be decomposed as in (2):
where η itjs describes the random component of performance, η itjs~I ID(0,σ η 2 ). 25 This idiosyncratic component allows for random errors by the athletes, or for unforeseen circumstances affecting the performance of an athlete during a lift. As above, our most general specification allows for athlete-year-competition fixed effects.
The assumption of strict exogeneity of interim rank and announcement in (4) is likely to be violated, since both variables may depend on the outcome of previous attempts. 26 We then 24 The first stage of snatch is dropped because the interim ranking is not defined for the first stage. 25 The assumption that η itjs~I ID(0,σ η 2 ) implies that there is no correlation between η itjs and ε itjr . This assumption is not essential for identification, but it simplifies the analysis and is realistic in our application. The shocks η itjs capture events that occur during the competition and may affect the performance of the athletes (e.g., the behavior of the public during the competition). Any variable which is fixed at the individual level, for a given competition, is captured by the athlete-year-competition fixed effects. Conversations with coaches and athletes indicated that athletes typically concentrate on successfully lifting the weight chosen by their coaches. Although coaches and athletes do communicate during the game, it is unlikely that the coach incorporates in the announcement decision the idiosyncratic effects captured by the error term η itjs . Moreover, the variables captured by η itjs are likely to be realized only during -or just before -the attempt, so they are unlikely to affect the announcement decision. 26 The correlation between interim ranking and previous performance may give rise to an upward bias in the impact of interim rank on performance. This endogeneity problem is different from the so called "sophomore slump" caused by mean reversion, a proceed under the assumption that such variables are predetermined. Including Rank itj (s-1) As before, lagged pre-determined regressors can be used as instruments. In contrast to the results on risk taking, we will show that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and accounting for endogeneity greatly affects the estimated impact of interim rank on performance.
The model presented in this section provides considerable computational advantages over a limited dependent variable model with endogenous explanatory variables and fixed effects. In fact, few results are available for this class of models (see Arellano and Honorè, 2001 , for a survey). In practice, one has to weigh the simplicity and flexibility of the linear fixed effects framework against the obvious disadvantage that the predicted probabilities may not lie between zero and one (see Bernard and Jensen, 2004) . In our application, the linear model is particularly appealing because it avoids putting restrictions on the correlation between regressors and individual heterogeneity. In the next section, we provide extensive robustness analysis using alternative specifications and also a fixed effects logit model. The results are not affected in any fundamental way.
Empirical Results

The Impact of Rank on Announcement
We first explore the relationship between interim rank and announcement using a fully flexible binary-variable specification for f 
misleading result that is sometimes mentioned in the popular press. This is typically obtained by trying to explain changes in performance between period t and t-1 using the level of performance in t-1.
where Rank(n) itj(s-1) is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i is ranked n th at the end of stage s-1. Table 2 reports results for model (1) using alternative fixed effects specifications. 27 Column 1 provides the estimated coefficients when we control for athlete, year and competition fixed effects separately, whereas column 5 reports the estimates from our richest specification (including joint athlete-year-competition fixed effects). The omitted rank category throughout the table corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of being ranked n th relative to being first. announcements increase from first to sixth place, but then decrease for further decreases in rank until seventeenth place, after which there is no significant effect. The relation is precisely estimated and the alternative fixed effects specifications provide very similar results.
28 Table 3 reports results for model (3), where we approximate f(.) using a fifth order polynomial of Rank itj (s-1) . Column 1 reports the results obtained with the fixed effects estimator. Column 2 reports those obtained by taking first differences to eliminate the athlete-competition-year fixed effects, and then using the IV estimator (where instruments are the once-lagged regressors).
Column 3 reports the results obtained from the model in first differences using the GMM estimator, which exploits all the available moment restrictions. 29 Figure 3 plots the impact of interim rank on announcement for each estimation strategy.
The inverse-U relationship between interim rank and announcement clearly emerges from all estimation strategies. Announcements increase from first to sixth place, but then decrease for 27 Throughout the paper, we report robust standard errors clustered by athlete. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Table 2 reports only the coefficients of the first thirteen rank dummies; the full table is reported in Appendix A (Table A1) . 28 Figure A1 plots the estimated coefficients and confidence interval on the twenty rank binary indicators from our most restrictive specifications in Table 2 , column 5. 29 We choose to use a smooth function f(.) to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated and the number of instruments. The results do not change using higher order polynomials and the coefficients of the sixth or higher power of Rank itj (s-1) are never significantly different from zero.
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further decreases in rank. A change in ranking from first to somewhere between 11 th and 15 th has no impact on an athlete's announcement. The relationship progressively flattens towards the bottom of the ranking, where changes in rank have little impact on behavior.
The non-linear impact of interim rank on announcement is always statistically significant.
Relative to the fixed effects estimators in Figure 2 , accounting for endogeneity implies a more pronounced peak in the impact of rank on announcement. When ranked sixth, an athlete announces at least 1.8Kg more than when ranked first, which is 50 percent of the average increase in announcement between two stages (see Table 1 ).
The other estimated coefficients in Table 2 and 3 are in line with expectations. Both the impact of the previous announcement and the success indicator are positive and significant, as athletes cannot decrease their announcement and must increase it after a successful attempt.
Also, in the first three columns of Table 2 , we can estimate the impact of some athletes' characteristics. Being heavier (within a given category in a specific competition) implies higher
announcements. This confirms a well-known fact in weightlifting that a higher body mass allows athletes' to lift heavier weights. The number of competitors has a positive, but very small effect on announcement. 30 Finally, competing at home does not seem to induce athletes to take greater risks, as the coefficient on Home itj is never significant.
Interpretation of the impact of rank on announcement
Conventional wisdom from sports competitions tells us that the trailing team may have a large incentive to adopt riskier strategies in an attempt to catch up with the leaders (Grund and Gurtler, 2005) . Similarly, it has been argued that troubled firms and interim losers in corporate tournaments are more likely to take riskier strategies than market leaders (Bowman, 1982; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996, Chevalier and Ellison, 1997) .
31 30 The coefficient in Table 2 , column 3 indicate that having ten additional participants implies an average increase of 0.08 Kg in announcement. 31 This intuition has been formalized by Cabral (2003) , Goriaev, Palomino and Prat (2003) , and Anderson and Cabral (2007) .
The fact that the impact of rank is positive up to rank seventeen is broadly consistent with this literature.
The progressive flattening of the relation after the first six positions is also consistent with differences in risk-taking behavior at different points in the ranking. 32 Some additional details further support the link between the results in Figure 2 and differences in risk-taking behavior at different positions in the ranking. If changes in the benefits deriving from risk taking drive the results in Figure 2 , then we expect to observe particularly large differences between the estimated coefficients at ranks one and two, for while the leader has no gain from variability in rank, the second athlete may significantly gain from rank variability. We also expect to observe large differences between rank 3 and 4. In fact, prizes in weightlifting competitions display a significant discontinuity between 3 rd and 4 th rank. This provides incentives to take riskier strategies when ranked 4 th than when ranked 3 rd .
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We find strong support for these hypotheses: the coefficient for rank two is statistically different from zero at conventional levels ( Table 2 , column 5), and so is the difference in coefficients between rank three and four. 34 Moreover, the differences between rank one and two (0.397 Kg), and three and four (0.235 Kg), are larger than any other difference between adjacent ranks.
Risk taking and absolute distance from competitors
The inverted-U relationship of rank on announcement observed in Figure 3 remains unchanged when we control for additional variables potentially affecting risk-taking behavior.
For example, we would expect athletes to take more risks and increase their announcement in an attempt to overtake their competitor if they are relatively close to the athlete just above them, but 32 Since rewards are decreasing at a decreasing rate going down in the ranking, the benefit from variability in rank is expected to decrease substantially towards the bottom of the ranking, where catching up with the leaders becomes progressively more unlikely. 33 The discontinuity in rewards locally affects the concavity of the relation between rewards and rank, so that incentives to take risks are drastically different just above and below this threshold. 34 F(1, 3762)=11.47, p-value=0.001.
relatively far from the competitor just below in the interim rank. On the contrary, we would expect athletes to reduce risk taking and try to defend their position if they are relatively far from the competitor just above, but close to the competitor below in the interim rank.
For each observation, we compute the difference in score between each athlete and the athletes ranked just above and below. We then classify each observation in one of four categories and define four corresponding indicator variables: FF when a given athlete is far from both the athletes leading and following (1 percent of the observations); FC when a given athlete is far from the athlete leading but close to the athlete following (4 percent); CF in the opposite case (5 percent); and finally CC when both are close (90 percent). 35 We then use CC as the base line category, and include the remaining three indicators in model (1).
Results using model (3) are reported in Table A2 , column 1. Announcement is 1.2 kg higher when the competitor in front is close but the trailing athlete is far (CF) relative to the baseline category, while 1.2 Kg lower in the opposite case (FC), and not significantly different when both are far (FF). Most importantly, the coefficients on rank imply that the pattern in Figure 3 is not affected. 36 This further supports the relation between announcement decision and risk-taking behavior.
Risk taking and intensity of the competition
A second concern could be that a higher concentration of athletes with similar performance might affect individuals' risk taking, as competition becomes more intense. We construct a measure of the intensity of the competition which varies at the individual level within a competition. Given the interim score s itjs of athlete i, in year t, competition j, and stage s, we compute the number (N itjs ) of athletes k≠i with interim score s ktjs within a 10Kg radius: (s itjs -10)≤ s ktjs < (s itjs +10). We then construct a binary indicator for tough competitions, which is equal to 35 We classify two athletes being far apart if the distance between their interim scores' is higher than the ninety-fifth percentile of the distribution of distances in that particular stage. We also experimented using the ninetieth or the seventy-fifth percentile as the cut-off. Our results qualitatively remain the same. 36 The results are consistent with the incentives to take risk discussed in the literature (Bronars and Oettinger, 2001 ).
19 one when our measure of intensity of the competition is above 50 percent. 37 Table B2, column 2 reports the results from model (3) when we add the binary indicator for tough competitions.
More intense competition stimulates more risk taking. Again, the pattern described in Figure 3 is not affected. 
The Impact of Rank on the Probability of a Successful Lift
We first explore the relationship between interim rank and the probability of a successful lift using a fully flexible dummy-variable specification, Table 4 reports results for model (4) using alternative fixed effects specifications. 39 The omitted rank category corresponds to the athlete ranked first, so all the rank coefficients measure the impact of being ranked n th relative to being first. Figure 4 plots the estimated coefficients from Table 4 .
In sharp contrast to model (1), controlling for more sources of unobserved heterogeneity has a substantial impact on the results reported in Figure 4 . There is no significant correlation between interim ranking and probability of a successful lift when we control for athlete, year, and competition fixed effects separately. 40 However, as we progressively control for additional sources of unobserved heterogeneity, a positive and statistically significant relationship appears. This result is driven by an omitted variable bias. Individuals with higher ability are likely to be ranked towards the top, and they also perform better on average. When we do not control for 37 On average, the fraction of competitors within the 10Kg interval is twenty-six percent, with a median of twenty-four percent. So the fifty percent cut-off level captures the behavior of athletes facing relatively high concentrations of competitors around them (90 th percentile). Results are robust to changes in either the radius around an athlete or the cut-off level that we use. 38 We have also experimented by interacting the indicator for close competitions with the rank dummies and the other regressors in model (1). The results are not affected. 39 All specifications include stage-specific dummy variables. Table 4 reports only the coefficients for the first ten rank dummies. The full table is reported in Appendix A (Table A3) . 40 Some coefficients in Table 4 are significantly different from zero, suggesting a negative impact of rank within a very small range, but these results are not robust. 20 individual characteristics, the rank variable captures the impact of differences in quality, so the performance at the top of the ranking is overestimated. 41 As discussed in the previous section, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important but does not account for the possible endogeneity of Rank itj(s-1) . We expect a negative correlation between the lagged error term u itj (s-1) and Rank itj(s-1) , since a successful lift typically implies an improvement in the interim ranking at the end of the stage (i.e., a decrease of the Rank variable).
This generates a positive correlation between the change in rank (∆Rank itj(s-1) ) and the error term (∆η itjs ) of the model in first differences (6). Thus, we expect the fixed effects estimator to be biased upwards. 42 Column 2 reports the results for model (6) using once-lagged pre-determined regressors as instruments, whereas column 3 reports those obtained using all the available moment restrictions. Figure 5 plots the impact of interim rank on the probability of a successful lift for each estimation strategy.
There is a significant positive relationship between ranking and the probability of a successful lift, independently of the estimation strategy adopted. Conditional on the announced weight, the probability of a successful lift is at least 10 percent higher when an athlete is sixth rather than first. The relation between rank and performance is slightly concave, implying decreasing marginal effects of moving down in the ranking. The IV estimation strategies reveal that the fixed effects estimator is indeed biased upwards. The magnitude of the impact of rank is now much smaller, at least half of that obtained with the fixed effects estimator. (Table  A3 , column 6). The impact of rank on the log-odds of a successful lift is positive and statistically significant. 42 The results do not change using higher order polynomials and the coefficients of the third and higher power of Rank itj(s-1) are never significantly different from zero. 43 It is not worthwhile to deliberately fail an attempt, go down in the ranking and benefit from a higher probability of a successful lift. Given the average probability of failing an attempt and the realized distribution of scores, the implied gains do not compensate the losses from forfeiting one attempt.
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Finally, the results in Table 5 show that the estimated impact of Announcement itjs is always significantly negative, as expected. Higher announcements naturally lead to a lower probability of success, as the individual risk-reward frontier is downward sloping. On average, an increase of 1Kg in the weight implies a 1.2 percent decrease in the probability of a successful lift.
Interpretation of the impact of rank on performance
The results from model (4) imply that moving towards the top of the ranking decreases performance. One potential explanation for this surprising result is based on contextual/psychological effects. Athletes' performance may deteriorate when the stakes are higher, or the importance of success is higher (Baumeister, 1985) , or when there is more pressure from other individuals, whether friendly or not (Zajonc, 1965; Baumeister, Hamilton and Tice, 1985) . 44 Stakes are higher at the top of the ranking, as are the importance of a successful lift and the potential pressure created by the public and the media. This suggests that athletes may perform worse when ranked closer to the top. The coaches we interviewed reported that it is expected for athletes to perform systematically better in training sessions than in competitions, which suggests that psychological pressure may indeed be important.
Prestigious versus non-prestigious competitions
There is no doubt that prizes (both monetary and not) and media coverage are much higher for the Olympic Games and World Championship than for the European Championship. Thus, one would expect pressure to be higher (and hence performance to be lower) in the most prestigious competitions. Alternatively, one might expect athletes to exert more effort and perform better in more prestigious competitions. This second hypothesis is consistent with the existing literature (briefly summarized in Section 1) linking the value of prizes in contests to competitors' effort.
We interact all explanatory variables (rank and stage binary indicators and announcement at each stage) in model (4) with a binary variable equal to one for less prestigious competitions (European Championships) and zero otherwise. 45 Table 6 reports the impact of interim rank on performance in the two types of competitions (computed for the average announcement at each stage), which are also plotted in Figure 6 .
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Performance is significantly lower in more prestigious competitions: the average difference in the two curves in Figure 6 is 13 percent. 47 These findings suggest that psychological pressure may indeed dominate the increased effort in important competitions. Moreover, the fact that both curves in Figure 6 are upward sloping shows that the positive relation between rank and performance is robust when controlling for possible differences between the two types of competition.
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Tiredness
An alternative interpretation for our results could be that athletes at the top of the ranking are more fatigued, having successfully lifted heavier weights, and so their performance may decrease in subsequent attempts. We find this explanation unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, it is not necessarily the case that a successful attempt is more tiring than a failed one. Hence, it is not necessarily true that athletes are more tired when ranked at the top, since an athlete may be ranked at the bottom after a series of ambitious -yet unsuccessful -attempts. Second, we reestimate model (6) controlling for tiredness using the cumulative weight attempted in previous 45 The European Championships take place every year, whereas the World Championships alternate with the Olympic Games, taking place every four years. So there are many instances in which the same athlete can participate in both types of competitions during a single year. 46 Denote by P prestigious competitions and define the indicator variable P equal to one for prestigious competitions. Table A4 in Appendix A reports the estimated coefficients controlling for athlete-year fixed effects, which is the most restrictive specification we can use. 47 To control for self-selection of athletes into the two types of competitions, we re-estimate the same model restricting the sample to those athletes who participated in both competitions in the same year. The impact of interim rank is reported in Table  6 , columns 3 and 4. The results are substantially unaffected, although the average distance between the two curves is slightly smaller (9 percent). 48 We also estimate the impact of rank on risk taking in the two types of competition, controlling for athlete-year fixed effects. We find that announcements are higher in more prestigious competitions, particularly towards the bottom of the interim ranking. Results are reported in Table A5 and Figure A2 . stages. Results from Table 7 , column 2 (column 1 simply reproduces column 3 from Table 5 to ease comparison) reveal that its impact is negative but small, and that it leaves the impact of rank on performance virtually unchanged.
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The effect of intensity of competition In principle, performance at the top may decrease as a result of weaker incentives to perform well. This seems unlikely, since our data refers to international competitions with substantial rewards, in which athletes are likely to exert maximum effort. Still, we try to control for possible confounding factors. If incentives are lower when competition is less intense, and competition is systematically less intense at the top of the ranking, then performance may be decreasing moving towards the top of the ranking, without any psychological pressure. This hypothesis suggests controlling for intensity of the competition in model (4). 50 We estimate model (6) including our measure of intensity of the competition (as defined in Section 4.2) among the regressors. The new variable depends on the previous history of the competition, so it is treated as predetermined. Table 7 , column 3 reports the results. The impact of the indicator for close competitions is negative and significant. On average, being in close competition decreases the probability of a successful lift by about 14 percent.
51 Most importantly, the positive impact of interim rank on performance suggests that our results are not driven by the impact of intensity of the competition on effort.
The potential gains from a successful lift
Another potential explanation for our results is that, for a given announcement, the potential gain in rank from a successful lift may increase moving towards the bottom of the ranking, leading to an increase in athlete's effort and performance. To measure this effect we compute for 49 The impact of announcement drops, but this is simply due to the high correlation between announcement and cumulative weight attempted in previous stages. The results are unchanged when including the interaction of cumulative weight and interim rank. 50 The literature suggests that effort (and therefore performance) may be affected by the intensity of competition (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990) . 51 The impact of rank on performance remains unaffected even when we include the interaction between intensity of the competition and interim rank. The coefficient of the interaction variable is not significantly different from zero.
each observation the potential improvement in rank position in case of success, given the observed performance of all the other competitors. 52 As expected, we find that there is an increase in the potential gain from a successful lift as one moves towards the bottom of the ranking; however, the potential gain in rank is on average small, so that individuals at the bottom of the interim ranking are extremely unlikely to reach the top positions and be awarded significant prizes.
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We re-estimate model (6) including this measure of potential gains among the regressors. Its impact on the level of performance is not statistically significant (Table 7 , column 4). The impact of rank on performance is still positive and highly significant. Thus, the impact of rank on performance is unlikely to be caused by differences in incentives to exert effort at the top and at the bottom of the ranking.
Secured positions
Some athletes may have secured their position before the end of the competition and hence may have little incentive to perform well. Since there is no penalty for not attempting the announced weight, athletes in such situations typically skip their attempt and their performance is recorded as a missing value in our data. In the raw data, there are few instances (1 percent) in which this occurred, and the corresponding observations are excluded from our sample. The issue of having secured a satisfying position is mostly relevant at the last stage of the competition. Thus, we re-estimate the model, dropping the observations for the last stage. The impact of interim rank on performance is unaffected (Table 7 , column 5).
Conclusions
We provide evidence of how risk taking and performance change depending on the interim rank position within a tournament. First, we show that professional athletes take greater risks when ranked close enough to the first athlete, but then revert to safer strategies when ranked 25 lower. This result is in line with the intuition that laggards may increase risk taking in an effort to catch up with the leaders. We also show that risk taking increases in more intense and in more prestigious competitions.
Our second set of results concerns the impact of interim rank on performance. 54 We show that performance decreases as an athlete gets closer to the top of the interim ranking. This result cannot be explained by unobserved individual-specific heterogeneity, by differences in the intensity of the competition, potential gains from increased performance, or physical fatigue at different points in the interim rank. We also observe underperformance in more important competitions, and when competition is more intense, suggesting that underperformance close to the top may result from psychological pressure.
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(1) The first column is estimated using athlete-year-competition joint fixed effects. The other two columns are estimated using first differences. In column (2) we use as instruments once-lagged predetermined regressors, whereas in column (3) we use all available moment restrictions. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses in column 1. Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis in columns 2 and 3: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
(1) (Table A3 ). Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
(1) The dependent variable is the announcement by athlete i, in year t, in competition j, at stage s of the game. The first column is estimated using athlete-year-competition joint fixed effects. The other two columns are estimated using first differences. In column 2 we use as instruments once-lagged predetermined regressors, whereas in column 3 we use all available moment restrictions. All equations include stage of the competition binary indicators. Standard errors clustered at the athlete level are reported in parentheses in column 1. Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis in columns 2 and 3: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
(1) P is the estimated stage-specific coefficient. The impact of rank one in prestigious competitions is normalized to zero. The estimated coefficients using athlete-year FE are reported in Appendix A (Table A4 ). The sample size in the last two columns is restricted to the athletes that participated in both types of games in the same year.
(1) Table 5 to ease comparisons. In column 5 we exclude from the estimation the last stage of the competition. Windmeijer (2005) corrected robust standard errors based on a two-step estimation procedure are reported in parenthesis: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
